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This article is centered on two of Sartre‟s literary works: “Nausea” and “No Exit” 
along with his dialectical theory of the „Look‟ in Being and Nothingness. I believe 
that these three texts represent not three distinct perspectives but rather different 
sets of approach to the same problem i.e. the phenomenon of human relationship. 
It is with this point in mind that I develop the following interrelated claims. First, 
even though Sartre intended to bring a new language and mode of articulation in 
his later works, the fundamental features of his philosophy remained the same. 
Thus, issues that are foundational to his early writing including the self/other 
relationship, the for-itself as project, the contingent reality of the world, the 
resistance of the in-itself/ materiality all figure high in his later writings as well. 
Second, as opposed to any social philosophy which accepts the possibility of a 
harmonious relation between human beings Sartre perceived the essence of human 
relations not as mitesein („being-with‟), but rather as conflict. I submit that the 
source of Sartre‟s problem lies in his very model of social relations given that his 
social ontology does not allow him to incorporate what Maurice Marleau-Ponty 
calls the "inter-world". This paper is also informed with the belief that although 
Sartre the intellectual and the creative artist are closely joined together, 
essentially, the novelist is much more assuring than the philosopher. Thus, even 
when he is not writing a literary composition proper he displays a unique talent of 
putting his philosophical ideas in artistic and dramatic terms. I use Sartre‟s 
phenomenological description of the dialectic of the "look" (Le Regard) to 
demonstrate this point. The final section of the paper is devoted to a critical 
examination of Sartre‟s philosophical positions developed in the works discussed 
above. 
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The central aim of this article is to bring to light Sartre‘s analysis of key existential 
issues which is located in his early writings. There are obviously different points of 
entry in to his thought, for my part I shall pursue my exploration by focusing on 
the following themes: (a) the confrontation of consciousness with existence 
(Nausea); (b) the question of the existence of the other (Being and Nothingness) 
and his Hobbesian depiction of human relationship (No Exit). 
 In the interests of clarity and plausibility, I shall present my account in 
stages always having the dialectal connection between beginning and end in mind. 
In the first stage, I shall deal with the phenomena of existence as portrayed in his 
famous novel Nausea. The central configuration of the novel is about the 
confrontation between consciousness and existence. Sartre‘s ontology is based on 
the distinction between two different types of beings: the being of objects of 
consciousness and the being of consciousness. He calls the former Being-in-itself 
and the latter ―Being-for-itself.‖ 
Nausea emphasizes one side of the duality of beings, i.e. on the being of 
object and existence. In his phenomenological account of existence, Sartre shows 
that there is much more to existence than we ever acknowledge in our everyday 
life. Existence is ―superfluous,‖ ―contingent,‖ and, above all, ―absurd.‖ Any 
attempt by philosophy, religion and science for that matter to hide this and 
introduce necessity to existences will be a futile exercise.    
In the second stage, I shall examine the issue of the existence of the other. 
Sartre‘s theory of intersubjectivity begins with a critical examination of the 
classical school which had a close affiliation with Cartesianism. He found this 
school to be highly susceptible to Idealism and Solipsism. Later, in Hegel, Husserl 
and Heidegger, Sartre found the essential corrective measure against the classical 
position known as the doctrine of analogy. From the above mentioned thinkers he 
took two essential points that also became the bases for his philosophical 
formulation: (i) that the self/other relationship is internally connected and (ii) that 
this connection is found in the very state of conscience.    
In the third stage, I shall deal with Sartre‘s third region of being, namely 
Being for others. To begin with, the other is encountered not constituted. The sheer 
appearance of the other generates suspicion and alarm since we both mutually 
desire ―the human world.‖  
Secondly Sartre‘s definition of the other as ―the one who looks at me‖ is 
presented in the short drama ―No Exit.‖ In the play, human relationship is fraught 
with struggle and conflict much more like Hobbesian state of nature.  
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In conclusion I want to advance the claim that Sartre‘s theoretical 
undertaking is contingent to a large extent upon the grounds laid out in his earlier 
philosophical works.     
Experience, existence and reality 
Robert C. Solomon is right on the mark when in his imaginary interviews with 
Sartre, Heidegger and Camus made Sartre claim that: ―My novel Nausea, which I 
wrote in 1938. I still think it is the best thing I ever wrote‖ (Solomon, 1981, p. 13). 
Most scholars share Professor Solomon‘s judgment. For instance, William Barrett, 
author of ―Irrational Man‖ consider Nausea as Sartre‘s best novel. On the 
philosophical plane, the novel is also taken to be as an important introduction to 
Sartre‘s phenomenological ontology that was to be worked out later in Being and 
Nothingness. 
The structure of the novel is fairly simple. The main character of the story is 
Antoine Requentin who initially set out to write a book about the life of an 
eighteenth-century adventurer, the Marquis de Rollebon. At the beginning of the 
novel, the reader is reminded that the publishers are reproducing the diary they 
have found in Antoine Requentin‘s papers. The core theme of Requentin‘s journal 
revolves around ―his account of how his relationships with the world, with things 
and people have profoundly changed‖ (Daigle, 2010, p. 27). In the end, though, his 
initial project did not see the light of day. Two major factors frustrated Requentin 
in his bid to play a historian. First, his time was consumed in trying to come to 
terms with a unique and alarming experience that had engulfed his existence. 
Second, he realized that in the absence of any meaning of his own existence, it 
would be futile to indulge in the construction of the events of another person‘s in 
life. 
What is the nature of this strange experience for Requentin? He tells us that 
the incidents that triggered this unusual experience are simple and ordinary.  There 
are different instances on how this odd experience occurs. While walking on a 
beach, his attempt to throw a pebble into the sea failed. His entry in his journal 
reads ―Saturday the children were playing ducks and drakes and, like them, I 
wanted to throw a stone into the sea. Just at that moment I stopped, dropped the 
stone and left. Probably I looked somewhat foolish or absent-minded, because the 
children laughed behind my back‖ (Sartre, 1959, pp.7-8).   
On another occasion he was not able to perform his usual habit of picking up 
a piece of paper that places on the pavement. He says: ―I saw a piece of paper 
laying beside a paddle. I went up to it. The rain had drenched and twisted it, it was 





rejoicing at the touch of this pulp, fresh and tender, which I should role my fingers 
into grayish balls…I was unable‖ (Sartre, 1959, p.17). 
Furthermore, he found out that objects have lately acquired a strange and 
unpleasant appearance. In his eyes, it is as if existence had become abnormal and 
out of the ordinary. Also to his surprise, objects gave him the impression of 
undergoing a radical change. Somehow everything he sees and touches around him 
appeared unpleasant. Roquentin scratched a note in his diary: 
 
A little while ago, just as I was coming into my room, I stopped short 
because I felt in my hand a cold object which held my attention 
through a sort of personality. I opened my hand, looked; I was simply 
holding the door knob. This morning in the library when the self-
thought man came to say good morning to me, it took me ten seconds 
to recognize him. I saw an unknown face, barely a face. Then there 
was this hand like a fat worm in my hand. I dropped it almost 
immediately and the arm fell back flabbily. (Sartre, 1959, p.11) 
 
Objects are transformed into undifferentiated hip of masses; they are without 
form, symmetry and regularity. Finally, in the world of Roquentin objects also 
seemed to have developed the power to make you sick: they bring a strange 
sensation that gives one ―sweetish sickness‖ as Sartre describes it. Certain 
existential conditions usually exasperate this ailment ; for instance, it struck when 
we are not standing on a sure footing in what we do and what we experience in 
life.  Thus, it comes at a time when we stop taking things for granted and when we 
are apprehensive about something. 
 
At first, he was not sure of the source of this strange discovery. Could 
it be in him? He asks: ―the Nausea is not inside me. I feel it out there 
in the wall, in the suspenders, everywhere around me. It makes itself 
one with the cafe; I am the one who is within it‖ (Sartre, 1959, p.31).   
 
As the story advances, he surely began to identify the real source of his 
predicament and nausea. Much to his surprise, he discovered that there was a 
connection between the alarming experience and the recurrent nausea that he was 
getting. He tells us that, ―now I see: I remember what I felt the other day at the age 
of the sea when, I held that pebble in my hand. It was a kind of sickly sweet 
disgust. How unpleasant it was: And it comes from the pebble. I am sure of it. It 
 
EJOSSAH Vol. XVI, No.2                                                     December 2020 
95 
 
passed from the pebble into my hands. Yes, that‘s it, that‘s just it: a kind of Nausea 
in the hands‖ (Sartre, 1959, p.31). 
Nausea somehow points to existence. Roqentin encounters with existence 
lead him to metaphysical experience such as the experience of absurdity and 
contingency. Never before did Roquentin experience existence in such a manner. It 
seems that existence had opened itself to him for the first time. Now he thought he 
understood the full meaning of existence. What is it Roquentin newly discovered 
about existence that he did not know before? In what manner did the new 
experience affect him? What possible lesson did he gain from it?   
His experience in the park is the most vivid expression of his encounter face 
to face with existence. While in a park sitting on a bench something hit him hard, 
his whole being was affected. It was just like a religious conversion. He puts it this 
way:  
It left me breathless. Never, until these last few days, had I understood 
the meaning of existence. I was like the others, like the ones waking 
along the seashore, all dressed in their spring finery. I said, like them 
―the ocean is green; that white speck or there is a seagull: but I did not 
feel that it existed or that the seagull was an existing seagull; usually 
existence hides itself…if anyone had asked me what existence was, I 
would have answered in good faith, that it was nothing, simply an 
empty form…and then all of a sudden, there it was clear as a day; 
existence had suddenly unveiled itself‖ (Sartre, 1959, p.171). 
 
He realized that there is much more to existence than he had ever anticipated 
before. Existence is like a mystery that will elude us until we remove our screen 
and try to grasp it intuitively. He also realized that up to now he had been forced to 
impose external attributes to things that were foreign to its essence. Requentin 
concluded that reality has the structure very far from the way we perceive it. The 
chief culprit here is language: that is, language and reality converge; our 
conventional disquisition fails to capture the truth of reality. 
This critical perspective is in line with Sartre‘s short but interesting essay 
called ―Intentionality‖ which he had written before. In that article Sartre claims that 
French Idealism greatly overstates the role of consciousness and human 
subjectivity and virtually eliminates any semblance of reality for the perceived 
object. Thus the object of the world loses its status of having an independent 
existence other than being a mere content of consciousness.  
In Nausea, Sartre advanced the same critical argument against what he calls 





tend to embellish reality in a sophisticated or poetical way. His reflections on the 
beach about the ocean led him to the conclusion that the ocean had been 
humanized. What poets adore, what painters draw on their canvas does not exist. 
What we have in the sea is instead ―black, knotty, mass, entirely beastly, which 
frightened me‖ (Sartre, 1959, p.171). Consequently, in order to come across the 
true face of the ocean, we have to transcend our anthropomorphic views that cover 
the reality of the ocean. 
But then, what is the positive lesson that his vision revealed to him about 
existence: Existence is always something extra; it is difficult to capture the total 
essence of existence in words no matter how hard we try. Rational discourse cannot 
exhaustively capture the essence of existence. That is why Requentin believes that 
existence is always superfluous. In Sartre‘s words, ―superfluous, the chestnuts tree 
there, in front of me, a little to the left, superfluous, the velleda. And I myself–soft, 
obscene, digesting, juggling with dismal thought…I am too superfluous‖ (Sartre, 
1959, p.173). What then does the concept of ―superfluous‖ connote? The terms 
suggest that we are unnecessary and contingent beings; that is, the world even more 
could have existed without us. Even what we consider as true is only ―accidentally‖ 
true since it could have been untrue. In short, existence is not embedded nor 
necessary-it is rather contingent, absurd, and superfluous.  
Regardless of what we think of it, everything is ―de trope;‖ man lives in the 
realm of the absurd. For Sartre, both being-in-the world and the Being-of the world 
belong to the realm of the absurd. For him ―contingency,‖ ―chaos,‖ ―absurdity,‖ 
etc. are synonymous. These terms reflect the arbitrariness, purposelessness and 
aimlessness of being. In the end, the absurd has no ground for its existence. If 
existence is basically absurd, our effort to reject and hide this fact is fruitless. 
Requentin says ―…‗absurdity‘ is emerging under my pen, and without formulating 
anything, clearly, I ‗understood that‘ I had found the clue to existence, the clue to 
my Nausea, to my own life‖ (Sartre, 1959, p.173). Nausea offers a concerted effort 
to force us to accept the truth about existence even if it is disagreeable with us. But 
people who are not reflective enough about themselves and the world do not 
necessarily find this to be true. They find it hard to admit that existence is 
fundamentally absurd and that things exist in a contingent and non-necessary way. 
In fact they believe that they exist by necessity. Two classes of people are prone to 
reject the idea that absurdity and contingency underline the fundamental structure 
of all existing reality. This group is made up of ‗philosophers‘ and the ‗bourgeois‘, 
i.e. those who are high in the social ladder.  
In order to hide and displace the idea of absurdity and contingency, 
philosophers invent the idea of order, reason and necessity but such an attempt is 
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doomed to failure because the supposed reality they claim about does not exist in 
actuality. Such a world is illusionary: ―But no necessary Being can explain 
existence: contingency is not a delusion, a probability which can be dissipated; it is 
the absolute, consequently, the perfect free gift‖ (Sartre, 1959, p.176). The 
Bourgeoisie, however, sees things differently. They hold that their Being is 
stamped with permanence and ―necessity‖ that their social status and role in society 
affords them the right to exist. Sartre despises such groups and has nothing good to 
say about them. 
 On the other hand, Sartre believes that the poor, the Jews and the Negroes 
knew all along instinctively what Requentin had discovered intuitively. That is why 
he shows sympathy to those groups of people as opposed to the ruling class or 
bourgeoisie. Traces of Sartre‘s lifetime sympathy and support for the downtrodden 
is present in this novel. The philosophical message we get in the novel could be 
summed up in the following points: (i) Existence is fundamentally absurd and we 
need to accept this truth beyond any doubt. (ii) Existence is always ‗extra‘ no 
matter how much we try, it refuses to fit into our descriptive mode. (iii) The 
categories of ‗necessity‘ is our invention, hence the world is and could have existed 
without us. Here one could surmise that if Sartre is asked the old metaphysical 
question: ‗why is there something rather than nothing‘? I am sure that he would 
answer that ‗there need not be anything at all‘. 
 
Encounter of the self and the other: Descartes to Sartre 
Sartre deals with the crucial problem of human relationship in two stages. In the 
first stage, he examined the condition and possibility of the existence of others in 
Being and Nothingness and the second stage, he dealt directly with the issue of 
human relations in No Exit. The genesis and foundation of Sartre‘s theory of 
intersubjectivity begins in his notion of what he calls Being-for-others. It is an 
essential component of human existence whose validity as a concept falls entirely 
on the existence of other subjects. That is precisely why Sartre took his time to 
study and critique other theories that professed to have ‗proved‘ the existence of 
others. 
Sartre‘s theory of the ―Other‖ begins with a critical examination of the 
classical school known as ‗the doctrine of analogy‘ which had a close affinity with 
Cartesianism, and he found this school to be highly susceptible to idealism and 
solipsism.  
The metaphysical legacy that Descartes left behind concerning the 
relationship between the mind and the body preoccupied subsequent philosophers 





philosophical positions. The first premise is that we know our ideas directly and 
immediately, whereas the external world is known to us via mediation and 
inferentially. Thus while he proved his existence as a thinking being Descartes 
failed to establish the existence of his body and the external world with equal 
certainty and epistemic rigor.   
The second inference is that consciousness and the external world constitute 
two distinct beings – that the cogito is radically different from corporal body and 
all other extended entities. In the synopsis for the six meditations we read: ―I prove 
that the mind is really distinct from the body (although I show that the mind is so 
closely joined to the body, that it forms one thing with the body)‖ (Desecrates, 
1979, p.10). The two substances that comprise his nature are so unlike each other. 
Descartes believes that it was possible to envisage the existence of mind without 
the body. He states that ultimately, ―thought is an attribute that really does belong 
to me. This alone cannot be detached from me‖ (Descartes, 1979, pp.18-19). 
The doctrine of analogy rests in the belief that since it is impossible to have 
direct access to other minds, the only mechanism we have to know the other is 
inferentially. John Stuart Mill, who is the chief representative of the school, noted 
that: 
 
I conclude that other human beings have feelings like me; first they 
have bodies like me, which I know, in my own case, to be the 
antecedent condition of feelings; and because, secondly, they exhibit 
the acts, and other outward signs, which in my own case I know by 
experience,  to be caused by feelings…experience, therefore, obliges 
me to conclude that there must be an intermediate link…to be of the 
same nature as in the case of which I have experience – I bring other 
human beings as phenomena. (Malcolm, 1963, p.16) 
 
From such observations we can make a safe deduction that the ‗reaction‘ that 
others show must have been caused by similar internal events like ourselves. In 
other word, when we perceive similar bodily behavior in the ―other‖ it would be 
correct to infer that he or she is a subject and that similar things are taking place in 
her or his mind. In short, inference, deduction and postulation are required to have 
access to other minds.   
Later drawing on Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger, Sartre (BEING and 
NOTHINGNESS) found the essential corrective measure against the classical 
school. Their approach was indeed seen by him as a great progress from the old 
tradition at least in two essential points; they viewed self/other relation as 
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essentially connected and the ‗other‘ cannot be an object of knowledge since 
fundamentally its relation with me is one of being to being. But Sartre of course 
criticized as he appropriated and naturally found some grounds of disagreement 
with their work. He contends that even though they made gains over the school, 
they nevertheless failed to establish the ―other as an irreducible fact‖ and hence end 
up compromising their work to Idealism.  
Among the four philosophers, Hegel comes closer to Sartre regarding this 
particular issue. This is all the truer since Alexander Kojeve‘s Lecture on Hegel‘s 
phenomenology triggered a revival of Hegelian studies in post-war France. Mark 
Poster, in his influential book Existential Marxism in Postwar France 
acknowledged the importance of Kojeve for Sartre‘s understanding of Hegel. He 
states ―Kojeve was able to put in relief those aspects of Hegel‘s thought that lead to 
Marxism and Existentialism" (Poster, 1975, p.16). 
As is commonly known, the phenomenology is an ambitious undertaking 
which tries to trace the dialectic of human consciousness from the lowest stage of 
its inception up to and including what Hegel calls ―Absolute Knowledge.‖ It is 
neither relevant (for our purpose) nor possible to summarize the spirit of this great 
work in a few preliminary remarks. What is intended in the following pages is to 
select the relevant text in the book that clearly demonstrates the connection with 
Sartre‘s ontology of selfhood and intersubjectivity. 
In Hegel, Sartre found a break and a means to transcend the heritage of 
Cartesianism. In doing so, because ―he places himself on the plane of reciprocal 
relationship between one consciousness and the other which Descartes does not as, 
by saying, ―I think, therefore I am,‖ he already takes himself for granted‖ (Lafroge, 
1970, p.115). Thus, for Sartre, Hegel made a tremendous gain over the old doctrine 
by correcting the error that an immediate knowledge of the individual self is 
possible. In contradistinction to the Cartesian school, Hegel advanced the thesis 
that: (i) self-awareness is not given directly but can only be achieved through the 
complex relations and meditations of others; (ii) precisely because a self becomes 
conscious of its relationship to itself in mutual self-interactions, all relation 
between two selves or relation with others is not external but internal. Sartre fully 
accepted the above Hegelian position that emphasizes the point of view that self-
consciousness has pre-condition. He also endorses and expanded Hegel‘s view that 
self-consciousness take place in antagonistic and conflictual ambience.  
Just as Sartre finds the ―I‖ of the Cogito as being too formal and abstract, 
Hegel sees the ―I‖ of desire as ―an emptiness that receives real content only by 
negating action that satisfies desire, in destroying, transforming and assimilating 





does not lead to self-consciousness; objects only leave us with ―thingish I‖ far from 
the ―reflexive movement of the self-awareness.‖ As Kojeve succinctly puts it: 
 
If, then the desire is directed towered a ―natural‖ non-I, the I, too, will 
be ―natural‖. The I created by the active satisfaction of such a desire 
will have the same nature as the things toward which that desire is 
directed. It will be a ―thingish‖ I, a merely living I, an animal I and 
this natural I, a function of the natural object, can be revealed to itself 
and to others only as sentiment of self, it will not attain self-
consciousness (Kojeve, 1996, p. 5). 
  
The question is what shape and form does the dialectic of consciousness take 
in order to transcend such a bare or minimal state of existence? In other words, 
how would this ―I‖— the I of desires enrich and transform itself from the simple 
stage of sentiment to a more complete level of consciousness? Hegel expresses his 
view to the above question in the following terms: 
 
Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when and only when by the 
fact that it so exists can another; that is, it exists only in being 
acknowledged. Each (self-consciousness) is the mediating term to the 
other, though which each mediates and unites itself with itself. Each is 
to itself and to the other as immediate self-existing reality, which at 
the same time exists for itself through this mediation, they recognize 
themselves as mutually recognizing each other (Hegel, 1977, p.11). 
 
The full import of the above text is explicated in the fourth section of The 
Phenomenology under heading ―Independence and Dependence: Lordship and 
Bondage.‖ The core idea of the master/slave dialectic underscores the fact that self-
consciousness is dependent on something other than itself.  
 
The Dialectic of the ‘Look’  
"Pannwitz is tall, thin, blond; he has eyes, hair, and nose as all 
Germans ought to have them, and sits formidably behind a 
complicated writing-table. I, Häftling 174517, stand in his office, 
which is a real office, shining, clear and ordered, and I feel that I 
would leave a dirty stain whatever I touched.  
When he finished writing he raised his eyes and looked at me. 
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From that day I have thought about Doktor Pannwitz many times and 
in many ways… 
Because that look was not one between two men; and if I had known 
how completely to explain the nature of that look, which came as if 
across the glass window of an aquarium between two beings who live 
indifferent worlds. I would also have explained the essence of the 
great insanity of the third Germany. 
(Levi, 1959, pp. 122-23) 
 
The issue of existence of other beings does not require a proof: it should 
rather be addressed at the level of ontology. As human beings, we have a 
primordial experience of persons. Just as we apprehend ourselves without the aid 
of any reflection, we recognize the other also as a subject – all what is needed is 
simply to clarify and properly articulate the basis of this experience and certitude. 
We should, then, seek and discover some sort of cogito that connects us to another 
person. It is only this ―enlarged‖ cogito that would enable me to emerge outside 
myself into some direct experience of another person. 
According to Sartre, the particular experience of the cogito that guarantees 
or help us establish ―the independence of the other‖ is that of ―being-looked-at by 
another.‖ It is the ―look‖ that makes my experience for the other possible. It is 
through his ―look‖ that the other person makes himself reveal to me as a being for-
itself, i.e., a being endowed with subjectivity, consciousness and transcendence. 
Even though the ―look‖ manifests itself primarily through the eyes, such things 
like the sound of footsteps or half-opened windows could reveal the phenomenon 
of the ―look.‖ That is why apprehending the ―look‖ does not necessarily mean 
seeing the nature, i.e. shape, form, color of the eyes, but simply realizing that we 
are in the presence of the other. In my initial encounter with the other, I do not 
perceive him as an object first and then recognize him as a subject later. Through 
his ―look,‖ I understand right at the outset that, like me he is ―a transcended 
transcendence.‖ In that he is capable of overcoming things that encounter him and 
is ―an object‖ to be looked at the same time. Sartre relates:  
 
I am in a public park. Not far away there is a lawn and along the edge 
of that lawn there are benches. A man passes by those benches. I see 
this man; I apprehend him as an object and at the same time as a man. 





is man?... If I were to think of him as being only as a puppet, I should 
apply to him the categories which I ordinarily use to group temporal-
spatial ―things‖…..perceiving him as a man, on the other hand, is not 
to apprehend additive relation between the chair and him, it is to 
register an organization without distance of the things in my universe 
around that privileged object‖ (Sartre, 1975, p. 254) 
 
Thus once I notice that he displays some sort of purpose and unity in his 
dealings and interactions with his surroundings, I know for sure that this unifying 
entity is the other person. The sheer appearance of the other generates suspicion 
and alarm since we both mutually desire the ―human world.‖ That is why being-
for-others as a mode of existence is quite a risky matter to the ―self‖ since the other 
continuously wants to circumvent my ability to exist as an active and engaging 
being. Hence, being-for-itself is all the time in a state of endless struggle and 
resistance to avoid being reduced into an object for the other. In sum, for Sartre, 
the other by definition is ―the one who looks at me.‖ In his gaze, he robs my world, 
kills my subjectivity and makes me dependent upon a freedom which is alien to 
me.  
Prior to my encounter with the other, I had everything going on for me. I 
was in full control of myself, my surroundings and the world at large. Besides, I 
had the final say over all matters. I was also the source of all meaning and values. 
In general, I was the lord and master of the Universe. But with the appearance of 
the other, and his dreadful look, my world is shattered. Everything which was 
under my world is reconstituted around him. I am consequently negated as a 
center: my world is torn asunder and taken away from me. Also, he has now 
become a center about which a total world is organized. I am overwhelmed by his 
activity. He has displaced me so to speak, and I am no longer in a position to 
influence my surroundings in any way I want to. My world is robbed in the sense 
that ―the world has a kind of drain hole in the middle of its being and that it is 
perpetually flowing off through this hole" (Sartre, 1975, p. 256). 
As a result my activity is severely curtailed and what I see and encounter 
around me is not my making. Under his look, I am placed in a strange world and I 
am engulfed with feelings of alienation. It is as if I am placed in his world rather 
than mine. In short, I have lost control of my own situation; things have lost their 
meaning and have become unpredictable. The surroundings which were familiar 
before have now acquired strange characteristics and even its existence has 
become probable. 
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Now it follows from this that my world is robbed. The mode of being that 
describes this annihilating and alienating experience of the other is the 
phenomenon of ―shame.‖ Shame appears as a testament of the alienating power of 
the other. Shame, says Sartre, ―is the recognition of the fact that I am indeed that 
object which the Other is looking at and judging‖ (Sartre, 1975, p. 261). Thus, for 
Sartre, shame, as a mode of experience, is a feeling that takes place in a 
confrontation between myself and the other. Indeed, without the look or the 
mediation of the other, it would have not been possible to experience shame. 
Shame takes place when I realize that I exist for the other or, in Sartre's 
formulation, when I become a "being-for-the-other.‖ My whole being is 
restructured when I begin to see myself as the other sees me. In other words, I start 
seeing myself from the point of view of the other. Hence, I am now he ―who the 
other sees‖ and knows. I have acquired a nature, an 'outside‘ and  reduced to an 
object which looks at and judges; shame is, then, the awareness or the ominous 
recognition that I have become a different being than I was just before his 
appearance. Sartre offers a classic illustration:  
 
Let us imagine that moved by jealousy, curiosity, or vice I have just 
glued my ear to the door and looked through a keyhole […] But all of 
a sudden I hear footsteps in the hall. Someone is looking at me! What 
does that mean? It means that I am suddenly affected in my being and 
that essential modifications appear in my structure (Sartre, 1975, pp. 
259-260).
 
The sheer perspective of the other forces me to pass judgment on myself as 
an object. His look makes me see myself as he would see me. I see myself in a way 
that I might have been seen. As a result, ―the other is the indispensable mediator 
between myself and me‖ (Sartre, 1975, p. 222).
 
Even supposedly that nobody 
witnessed my act, I would still experience that I might have been seen. Although, 
the other allows me to apprehend the inaccessible dimension of myself,
 
in the final 
analysis: ―shame therefore realizes an intimate relation of myself to myself‖ 
(Sartre, 1975, p. 221). I am the one who is ashamed of what I am doing but I need 
his mediation to know that structure of my being. 
And, furthermore, the other appears as a threat to my own freedom. The for-
itself is a being of freedom, a pure spontaneity with no fixed essence. But the other 
does not recognize me for what I am, that is, a subject endowed with freedom. 
Instead he sees me as an object that he can impart his value judgments. In his 





diminished. He has a transcendent power over me—the subjectivity that I enjoyed 
before his appearance on the scene is now negated. He has transformed me from a 
being-for-itself to a being-in-itself. My being-in-the-world shows the mark of this 
negative transformation. 
Again through his look, I experience for the first time my objectivity. In 
other words, I have forfeited my subjectivity. I no longer have the ability to 
transcend myself or my situation. It is in this sense that we consider ourselves as 
slaves insofar as we appear to the other. I have become enslaved since I live under 
his control and liberty; I am his tool-object that can be utilized for his purpose. So 
the I is ―equipmentalized‖ by the other. I am what he deems to make of me. After 
alienating my freedom, I have become ―a slave to the degree that my being is 
dependent at the center of a freedom which is not mine and which is the very 
condition of my being‖ (Sartre, 1975, p. 267). 
The questions whether there is any possibility that I can reassert my 
subjectivity to salvage my transcendent power, or if am I condemned to permanent 
servitude in my encounter with the other. For Sartre, I too have the potential to 
threaten his freedom by reciprocating his look by mine. By confronting the other 
by my "looks" I in turn can constitute him as an object. In doing so, I would be 
able to free myself from his bondage. Unfortunately, he in turn can also reverse the 
situation by looking back at me and make me an object for him. 
This endless movement from being-a-look to being looked-at is adopted in 
Sartre‘s classic play No Exist, which I am going to present in the next pages. In No 
Exit the story begins and ends in a large drawing room in hell, the three 
characters—Garcin, Estelle and Inez— enters the room separately knowing full 
well that they are all dead and have been sent to hell. What is interesting about 
these characters is that instead of creating friendship and solidarity they are bent on 
persecuting and tormenting one another. It somehow seems that the three have 
been selected and assigned to inflict the maximum pain and torturer on each other. 
As the play advances it becomes clear why they are one another‘s 
tormenters. Since the central story of the drama focuses on the characters and 
nature of the subjects evolved it would be appropriate to begin our review by 
examining the personality of the trio one by one. 
Inez is a character that comes from a poor, working-class background that is 
in an endless pursuit for Estelle's love and affection. As a lesbian-sadist, she not 
only enjoys seeing others suffer, but also ―needs" the pain of others for her 
distorted and inauthentic existence. She became a sadist because she has 
internalized the contemptuous look of a homophobic and intolerant society. Sartre 
hints in the play that instead of accepting society's judgment and condemnation, 
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she should have practiced freely her sexual preference. But Inez did not choose to 
do that and followed a different path. In a sense her sadism was a way of getting 
back at the hostile culture and a desire to transform the other into an object. 
Estelle a murderous coward who is extremely self-centered (narcissistic) 
with no other interest except trying to find out how others view her. She is entirely 
dependent on others' perspective of her. She is particularly obsessed in achieving 
male admiration and confirmation that would give her validation and acceptance 
by society. Naturally, she turns to Garcin, who is the only male figure around. In 
Garcin she hopes to find the realization of her burning desire (approval and love) 
in his arms. 
Garcin is a journalist who pursues the cause of pacifism until he is caught 
and shot trying to flee from his military duty. He is tormented by the question 
whether he was indeed a pacifist or a coward. He is deeply bothered about his 
character where a dilemma confronts him there, is his flight upon the outbreak of 
the war motivated by his moral aversion to violence, or is he simply a coward who 
lacked courage and fortitude in the face the enemy. The question is so important 
for him that he played the role of a Don Juan, hoping to prove that he was a "real 
man." 
What is common about the trio is that they all have yearnings—love and 
recognition—which the other can fulfil but none is able to do so. Each is incapable 
of giving what the other wants desperately. 
Consider the case of Inez; her sexual advances toward Estelle completely 
fail, as social snob who is highly dependent on male confirmation. Estelle cannot 
reciprocate her desire. For a woman who spent most of her life seeking and 
depending on male attraction and validation, Inez will be naturally unacceptable. 
In fact, if she had her way. Estelle would torment Inez by making love to Garcin. 
Inez could retaliate by not giving Estelle the image and affirmation that she 
needs badly. She jokingly reminds Estelle that: "suppose, I covered my eyes"; or 
turn my back not to seek you, ―you‘re loveliness‖ would be a waste. She knows 
very well that such talks make Estelle nervous and vulnerable. In a memorable line 
she says of herself: ―I feel so queer. [She pats herself.] Don't you ever get taken 
that way? When I can't see myself I begin to wonder if I really and truly exist. I pat 
myself just to make sure, but it doesn't help much‖ (Sartre, 1989, p.19). Beyond 
Estelle's narcissistic obsession about her self-image and quest for validation, Sartre 
is also suggesting the fact that they each need the mediation of the other for their 
existence. 
To go back to Inez's saga, her dream of receiving an embracing arm from 





Estelle, for her part, does not get her wish realized either. Before Garcin 
fulfills her desire, he wants her to help him resolve his deep-seated doubt about 
himself; he needs to be persuaded by her that he is not a coward. 
But for Estelle, his character is a non-issue. She is not interested to know 
whether he is a coward or not; questions of ethics do not have a place in her 
universe. Her interest in him is to get his love and uninterrupted attention. 
Sadly enough for Garcin, the only other person he can turn to is Inez. But in 
her cold, staring eyes, Inez recognizes his act as cowardice. The same hostile gaze 
of Inez also makes him incapable of making love to Estelle. 
It soon becomes evident to them that they are unable to make any purposeful 
use of each other. They also found out that hell is far from what they had imagined 
before. Much to their surprise, there is no ―torture-chambers, the fire and 
brimstone, the ―burning marl.‖ Old Wives‘ tales! There is no need for red-hot 
pokers. Hell is—other people!‖ (Sartre, 1989, p. 45). This means that they 
themselves are one another‘s tormenters; knowingly or unknowingly, each has 
created hell for the other.  
Garcin expresses their rage and frustration in statements that could be taken 
as the high climax of the play: 
 
“Estelle: Don't listen to her. Press your lips to my mouth. Oh, 
I'm yours, yours, yours.  
 
Ineze: Well, what are you waiting for? Do as you're told. What 
a lovely scene: Coward Garcin holding baby-killer Estelle in his 
manly arms! Make your stakes, everyone. Will Coward Garcin kiss 
the lady, or won't he dare? What is the betting? I'm watching you, 
everybody's watching, I'm a crowd all by myself. Do you hear the 
crowd? Do you hear them muttering, Garcin? Mumbling and 
muttering. ―Coward! Coward! Coward! Coward!‖—that is what they 
are saying… 
 












Garcin: …Yes, now's the moment; I'm looking at this thing on the 
mantelpiece, and I understand that I'm in hell. I tell you, everything's 
been thought out beforehand. They knew I'd stand at the fireplace 
stroking this thing of bronze, with all those eyes intent on me. 
Devouring me. [He swings round abruptly.] What? Only two of you? I 
thought there were more; many more. [Laughs.] So this is hell. I'd 
never have believed it… (Sartre, 1989, pp. 44-45). 
 
The crux of their problem lies in their failure to mutually recognize each 
other‘s need. Thus, in as much as they live and act their lives as others see them, 
instead of being themselves and exercising their freedom as ―for-itself,‖ they will 
not be able to overcome their misery. 
It is precisely in this context that we should understand Inez's sadism and 
Estelle's pathological obsession about her image. As for Garcin, he is no different 
from the other two. Consider his exchange in the play between him and Estelle: 
 
―Garcin: Estelle, am I a coward? 
Estelle: But I don't know, honey, I am not in your shoes. You have to 
make up your mind for yourself. 
Garcin: I can't make up my mind‖ (Sartre, 1989, p.37).  
The play clearly adumbrates the problem of seeking self-affirmation and 
dependence solely on others. It also shows graphically how our relations with the 
others could degenerate into torturer and tortured. For Sartre, "the idea that self-
reflection is the touchstone of self-recognition and others people and obstacles 
distorters mirror as it were" (Solomon, 1981, p. 7). 
Conclusion 
Even though every exposition presupposes a reading, the procedure I followed up 
to now had been expository. Henceforth, I shall adopt the role of a critic and 
engage Sartre mainly about his social ontology that underlines the structure of his 
―intersubjectivity.‖ In a sympathetic review of Being and Nothingness Merleau-
Ponty suggested to Sartre that his work was exclusively preoccupied with 
consciousness to the exclusion of the social and historical world; that he had 





He also suggested to him that in the future he should develop "a theory of 
passivity" and man and his world. Thus, without further development, he feared 
that "the book remains too exclusively authentic; the antithesis of my view of 
myself and another view of me and the antithesis of the for-itself and the in-itself 
after seem to be alternatives instead of being described as the living bond of 
communication between one term and the other" (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p.72) 
I believe that Sartre took Merleau-Ponty criticism quite to heart and tried to 
correct the shortcomings of his early writings. Thus, in the critique of Dialectical 
Reason he stretched his earlier theory to cover a broad range of issues such as 
man‘s relations with the material world and group relations. But even though he 
ventured to confront much broader questions, in the process he encountered 
serious problems. I submit that one of the main reasons why he faced a problem is 
that in spite of his adoption of the phenomenological/dialectical method, his habit 
of formulating his inquiry within a subject/object problematic remained with him 
to the last. 
As David E. Robert succulently put it, "His failure (Sartre‘s) as a 
philosopher, if he has failed, is due to the fact that his entire world view rests upon 
a radical arrangement which is worse than the dualisms he has ostensibly 
overcome" (Roberts, 1959, p. 197). Indeed, notwithstanding his useful notions of 
mediations his earlier dualistic stance reappears again and again. As a result, when 
analyzing key philosophical problems, he undermines the complexity of the 
problem and ends up resolving ―complexity into types.‖ Thus, for example, just 
like his earlier view, he comes perilously close in endorsing the belief that human 
beings are either totally free or totally in bondage.  
Second, Sartre‘s later work never fully resolved the ―tension‖ between his 
earlier formal categories that represent the power of consciousness and ―those built 
around to accommodate the force of circumstances. As a leading Sartre scholar 
Thomas W. Busch, alleges that Sartre to the end never fully worked out the 
relationship between "Being-in-the-world and the cogito" (Busch, 1990, p. 77). 
Third, in Sartre‘s notion of the look there is a tendency by consciousness to 
posit everything as an object. In addition, we are permanently tossed from one 
state of affairs to the other i.e. from being a look to being looked at. Thus human 
relationship is always instable and fluid since we cannot be subject and object at 
the same time.  Whenever the other emerges as a subject, he ceases to be an object. 
As a subject, he is beyond my control and that is why Sartre says that the existence 
of the other is a scandal for me.  
Whatever way we look at it, the chance of establishing "I and thou" 
relationship with the other is doomed to failure. I either transcend the other‘s 
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subjectivity or let myself be transcended by him. As a subject we have no use for 
each other, in the end, either the other reduces me to an object or I annihilate his 
subjectivity and make him an object for me.  
All efforts to neutralize the freedom of the other in the end fail to 
materialize. Even "love" does not succeed in this respect since it is quite 
impossible to attain the level of intimacy and affection which is free from a 
relationship of domination. Instead, the adversarial nature of my relation with the 
other leads into two kinds of reaction; sadism and masochism. Caught between 
these two ways, we never overcome the threat of the other.  
Since the other is intractable to any fraternal identification, concrete 
relationship with others is merely provisional if not impossible. In the final 
analysis, all relations inevitably end up in some form of conflict. Sartrean 
"systems" are devoid of any transcendent category that could be the bases for an 
optimistic human relationship. Thus for Sartre, the essence of human relationship 
is not being together but conflict.  
Consider No Exit we find the same pessimistic conclusion in the play in one 
scene and three characters, it succeeds remarkably well in capturing the essence of 
Sartre‘s teachings about human relationship. In it we find Sartre‘s complicated 
theory of the "look" with all its devastating effect on human subjectivity and 
human freedom being acted out as each character lives and relates her/his 
existence in hell. It is as though we are permanently condemned to a tragic failure 
attaining a peaceful and harmonious community.     
Sartre complains that some people incorrectly interpret the expression Hell 
is the other people literally. Consequently, he alleges they attribute to him 
"pessimism" that is quite remote from what he had originally intended. He writes: 
"Hell is other people have always been misunderstood. People thought that what I 
meant by it is that our relations with others are always rotten, illicit. But I mean 
something entirely different. I mean that if our relations with others are twisted or 
corrupted, then others have to be hell" (Contat & Rybalk, 1974, p. 99). But 
Sartre‘s explanation is questionable because No Exit does not offer an alternative 
reading other than the gloomy picture that is epitomized in Garcin‘s utterance.  
To be sure, No exit is not the last statement that Sartre made about human 
relationship but the kind of picture that is depicted in the play is quite consistent 
with what we find in Being and Nothingness. Both texts offer the destructive side 
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